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Is There an Income Penalty? 
 
This paper adds to the small literature on the consequences of education-occupation 
mismatches. It examines the income penalty for field of education-occupation mismatches for 
men and women with higher education in Sweden and reveals that the penalty for such 
mismatches is large for both men and women. In fact, it is substantially larger than has been 
found for the US. Controlling for cognitive ability further establishes that the income penalty is 
not caused by a sorting by ability, at least for Swedish men. The income penalty for men 
decreases with work experience which is an indication that education-specific skills and work 
experience are substitutes to some extent. There is no evidence, though, that the 
mismatched individuals move to a matching occupation over time. Thus, for some, the 
income penalty seems to be permanent. 
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1. Introduction 
There  is  now  a  fairly  large  literature  on  the  relationship  between 
overeducation/undereducation  (i.e.  having  a  higher/lower  education  level  than  that 
required for the job) and earnings (see e.g. Bourdet & Persson, 2008; Dolton & Vignoles, 
2000; Hartog, 2000; McGuinness, 2006; Rubb, 2003; Sloane, Battu & Seaman, 1999). 
The survey by Hartog (2000) concludes that the return to overeducation is about half to 
two-thirds  of  the  return  to  required  schooling.  The  penalty  for  undereducation  is 
somewhat smaller.
1 
As far as we know, very few studies as yet focus on the mismatch between the 
individual’s field of education and his/her occupation. Still, to fully utilize the stock of 
human capital in the population it is essential to match individuals’ education-specific 
skills (as opposed to more general skills) with the occupational job characteristics. The 
pioneering paper by Robst (2007a) emphatically brings out that this is another type of 
educational matching problem that should be investigated.
2 Using data on US college 
graduates  he  finds  that  having  a  major  subject  that  does  not  match  one’s  work  is 
associated with a roughly 11 percent lower annual income compared to having a major 
subject  that  does.  Thus,  the  income  penalty  for  a  field  of  education  -  occupation 
mismatch seems to be larger than the penalty for being overeducated/undereducated.
3 
Two data-related aspects might affect the interpretation of Robst’s results. Failing 
to control for ability and using a self-reported match/mismatch measure make it hard to 
infer that it is the mismatch that actually causes the income penalty. A mismatch may 
well be caused by a sorting by ability, or a self-reported mismatch might be endogenous 
and related to the wage, i.e. a self-reported mismatch may be a form of rationalization of 
a general feeling of disappointment with the wage and/or the workplace. Studies show 
that the method used to measure overeducation/undereducation affects the results (Battu, 
Belfield & Sloane, 1999; Groot & Maassen van der Brink, 2000). For example, Groot & 
Maassen van der Brink (2000) find that overeducation is more frequent when a self-
reported rather than an objective measure is used.  
                                                 
1 Recent Swedish studies provide similar results (see Korpi & Tåhlin, 2006; Johansson & Katz, 2007).  
2  In  a  subsequent  paper  Robst  extends  his  analysis  to  cover  both  types  of  educational  mismatches 
simultaneously. See Robst (2008). 
3 If the income penalty for one year of overeducation amounts to around 3 percent, then having a job that  
does not match one’s education is comparable to having about four years of overeducation.    2 
Ability seems to be related to being overeducated/undereducated. Sloane, Battu & 
Seaman (1999) note that promotion and supervisory experience is least common among 
the overeducated and most common among the undereducated, which suggests that the 
overeducated might have a lower ability level, and the undereducated a higher ability 
level, than the correctly matched individuals. They also show that the overeducated have 
more unemployment spells and involuntary quits than others. 
With an impressive dataset covering the entire age-group 28-39 in Sweden, this 
paper  reexamines  the  field  of  education  -  occupation  mismatch.  The  data  includes  a 
cognitive  test  score
4  and  detailed  education  and  occupation  classifications  make  it 
possible to objectively decide whether there is a match or a mismatch. Unlike Robst’s 
study,  which  is  restricted  to  graduates,  our  study  includes  everyone  with  some 
university/college education.   
The system of higher education in Sweden differs substantially relative to many 
other countries (for example the US) in that most fields of higher education are very 
specialized. Hence, the penalty for a field of education - occupation mismatch may be 
particularly large in Sweden (and in other countries with relatively specialized fields of 
higher education) since the students learn occupation-specific skills to a larger extent and 
relatively less of general skills at university/college. 
Overeducated individuals seem to have less experience, tenure and training than 
the correctly matched individuals, which indicates a possible substitution between formal 
education and experience (Sloane, Battu & Seaman, 1999). Workers outside their field of 
education also seem to receive more training than other workers (van Smoorenburg & 
van der Velden, 2000). Since we do not have access to data on work experience and 
training  we  are  unable  to  ascertain  whether  the  two  types  of  skills  are  substitutes  or 
complements. As an alternative we compare the return to (potential) experience between 
those who work in an occupation that matches their field of education and those for 
whom there is a mismatch. If the mismatched individuals lack education-specific skills, 
and these skills are substitutes for the skills learned at the workplace, the income penalty 
may be expected to decrease with work experience and on-the-job training.  
 
                                                 
4 The Swedish military enlistment test.   3 
2. Data 
The data is cross-sectional and comprises all individuals in the age-group 28-39 living in 
Sweden in 2003. Statistics Sweden (SCB) has constructed the data by adding education 
and income variables from the Swedish Register of Education (UREG) and the National 
Tax Board to the register of the total population (RTB). Enlistment data from Pliktverket, 
providing us with the cognitive military enlistment test, is also merged with the dataset.  
  Only  Swedish-born  individuals  with Swedish-born  parents  are  included  in  our 
sample.  Excluding  individuals  with  a  foreign  background
5  ensures  that  labor  market 
discrimination of such individuals does not affect the results. With this restriction the 
sample consists of 549 434 men and 518 968 women.  
Since the aim is to examine the field of education - occupation matches only 
individuals  with  a  higher  education,  i.e.  more  than  twelve  years  of  schooling,  are 
included  in  the  sample.
6  For  the  age-cohorts  in  this  study  the  college  and  university 
educated consist of 155 767 men and 208 616 women, i.e. roughly one third of the total 
cohorts. As some fields of education (e.g. in the humanities and languages) are either 
vague or cannot easily be matched with any specific occupation, we are forced to restrict 
the fields of education to the more well-defined ones. In so doing, we lose another 36 
percent of the individuals and the sample then becomes 97 296 men and 134 813 women. 
Excluding  11  percent  of  the  individuals  because  of  missing  occupation  data 
(probably caused by non-employment)
7, and 3 percent for whom the annual income from 
work is zero, makes the final sample 80 368 men and 119 265 women. Together, these 
exclusions incur the risk that the final sample is not perfectly representative of the total 
(non-foreign background) population of university/college educated. Rather, our study 
reports the income penalty for mismatches in the (non-foreign background) population of 
(employed) individuals who have invested in any of the more common or well-defined 
Swedish fields of higher education.  
 
                                                 
5 That is both the first and the second generation of immigrants. 
6 Ph.D.s and those who have attended “komvux” (a supplementary adult upper-secondary education) are 
also excluded.  
7 In addition certain types of occupations (heads and managers, politicians, sportsmen and models) that 
cannot be matched with a field of education are also excluded.   4 
An alternative to using positive income as a cut-off for our income variable would 
be to use annual income (from work) above a certain level. That would (at least to some 
extent) eliminate that part of the mismatch penalty that could reflect e.g. involuntary part-
time work. But to get results that are comparable to those in Robst’s study (which uses 
the log of annual wages) and to the overeducation/undereducation literature we start out 
by using positive income as our cut-off. In a sensitivity analysis we then study whether 
the choice of cut-off affects the results. 
Our educational attainment measure, SUN2000, is for the year 2003 and describes 
both  the  highest  level  of  education  achieved  and  the  field  of  education.  Twenty-four 
different fields of education are constructed on the basis of this information.
8  
Most fields of education (included in our final sample) are precise and match one 
distinct occupation perfectly, whereas some fields of education are broader and match  
two occupations (e.g. the social science field). All these field of education-occupation 
combinations  are  classified  as  being  matched.  Many  fields  of  education  also  weakly 
match  with  one  or  more  occupations;  these  combinations  are  classified  as  weakly 
matched. The remaining field of education-occupation combinations are then classified as 
mismatched.
9 Measurement errors
10 in the matching are likely to result in a downward 
bias in the mismatch effect, which means that the estimated mismatch effect will be a 
lower bound of the income penalty.  
                                     (Table 1 about here) 
Table 1 lists the fields of education together with the number of individuals within 
each field of education, the share of individuals with a job that does not match his/her 
field of education (mismatch), and the share with a job that weakly matches  his/her field 
of education (weak match). 23 percent of the men and 19 percent of the women are 
mismatched and 16 percent of the men and 10 percent of the women are weakly matched. 
                                                 
8 The SUN2000 measure is a revision of the former SUN classification adjusted to fit the International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED97). The education level is the highest level achieved and field 
of education is based on the individual’s main field of education. The field of education is initially given as 
a three-digit scale. Our classification into different fields of education is based as often on the second as on 
the third digit. The fields of education that are most often excluded from the data (for being too vague 
and/or too hard to match to occupations) are the following: language/arts, health, services and transport. 
The occupation data are also given as a three-digit scale. 
9 Table A2 reports the matrix of fields of education – occupations matching. 
10 For example, in Sweden there are individuals  who invest in an additional  field of education (often 
lawyers). However, there no information regarding multiple degrees or multiple fields of education.   5 
People with dentist, police, law and veterinarian educations are least often mismatched, 
whereas  those  with  a  biology,  psychology  or  artistic  education  are  most  often 
mismatched. It is also interesting to note that for some fields of education there are clear 
gender  gaps  in  the  share  mismatched.
11  Men  are  mismatched  to  a  larger  extent  than 
women  in  some  female-dominated  fields  of  education  (pre-school  teacher,  librarian, 
pharmacist, nurse) whereas women are mismatched to a larger extent than men in some 
male-dominated  fields  of  education  (master  of  engineering,  engineer).  Additional 
descriptive statistics are reported in table 2 for the matched, the weakly matched and the 
mismatched. Somewhat surprisingly, both age and experience are on average about the 
same for the matched and mismatched, men as well as women. But it can also be seen 
that the mismatched men (on average) have a substantially lower income level than the 
matched men. This is also the case for the mismatched women, although somewhat less 
pronounced.  Weakly  matched  men  have  about  the  same  average  income  level as  the 
matched men and the same goes for the weakly matched women relative to the matched 
women.  The  descriptive  statistics  also  reveal  that  both  men  and  women  without  a 
completed degree are overrepresented among the mismatched.  
                          (Table 2 about here; preferably above) 
 
3. Results 
3.1 The income penalty for being mismatched or weakly matched 
To  study  the  income  differences  between  matched,  mismatched  and  weakly  matched 
individuals  regular,  Mincer-type  income  equations  are  estimated.  The  full  model 
specification is:  
e l g d b b b b b a + + + + + + + + + = X ND FD WM MM Exp Exp S y j j 4 3
2
2 1 0 ln       (1) 
where the logarithmic of annual income from work is regressed on years of schooling, S, 
potential  experience,
12  Exp,  potential  experience  squared,  Exp￿￿ and￿ individual 
characteristics X. The income penalty for being mismatched, ￿3, and weakly matched, ￿4, 
                                                 
11 The gender differences in the incidence and character of education-job mismatches in the US are studied 
in-depth in Robst (2007b). 
12  Since  the  data  does  not  contain  actual  work  experience  the  standard  way  of  calculating  potential 
experience is used, i.e. exp = age – years of schooling – 7. (Swedish children start school when they are 7 
years old).   6 
are  picked  up  from  the  indicator  variables  MM  and  WM.  The  dummy  variables  FDj 
indicate field of education and the dummy variable ND that the individual does not have 
a degree.
13 
  Table 3 reports, separately for men and women, the income penalty for being 
mismatched  and  weakly  matched.  Column  1  gives  the  income  differences  when  the 
education of the individual is described only by the years of schooling variable. Being  
mismatched is associated with a sizably lower  income than being matched, about 38 
percent lower for men and about 26 percent lower for women. The weakly matched, on 
the  other  hand,  have  an  income  that  is  roughly  comparable  to  that  of  the  correctly 
matched individuals.  
        (Table 3 about here) 
Controlling for field of education, FDj, with j indicator variables, now ￿3 (￿4) 
gives the income difference between two individuals with the same field of education but  
one matched and the other mismatched (weakly matched). Column 2 shows that adding 
the  field  of  education  to  the  specification  changes  the  income  penalty  for  being 
mismatched in opposite directions for men and women; it decreases to about 34 percent 
for men and increases to about 32 percent for women. The finding that the gender gap in 
the income penalty for being mismatched decreases (from 12 percent to 2 percent), when 
field  of  education  is  controlled  for,  indicates  that  mismatched  men  have  invested  in 
relatively low-paid fields of education, whereas mismatched women have invested in 
relatively  well-paid  fields  of  education.
14  Given  the  field  of  education,  being  weakly 
matched is also associated with an income penalty for both men and women, but the 
penalty is much smaller than for the mismatched individuals.  
Since  the  sample  contains  individuals  who  have  not  finished  their 
university/college  education,  and  thus  not  achieved  a  degree,  the  variable  ND  (No 
Degree) is included in the model.
15 When this is taken into account (in column 3), the 
income penalty for being mismatched decreases by about 2 percentage points for men 
                                                 
13 For a list of  variables, see Table A1. 
14 This  is  probably  also  related  to  gender differences  in  the  reasons  for  being  mismatched,  see  Robst 
(2007b;  2008).  Based  on  his  data  Robst  is  able  to  distinguish  between  supply-side  reasons  (pay  and 
promotion opportunities, job location, family, change in career interests) and demand-side reasons (unable 
to find a degree-related job) for the individual’s decision to accept work outside his/her degree field. 
15 Table 2 reveals that 15 percent of the men and 12 percent of the women in our sample do not have a 
degree. Among the mismatched the shares are 28 percent respectively 27 percent.   7 
and  4  percentage  points  for  women.  Moreover,  the  income  penalty  for  being  weakly 
matched decreases somewhat. Still, the overall conclusion is that having a degree or not 
does not explain the income difference between the matched and the mismatched (or 
weakly  matched)  individuals.  To  illuminate  this  further,  we  have  estimated  separate 
earnings equations for those with and without a degree and found that there are large 
differences in the mismatch penalty. For those without a degree the income penalty for 
being mismatched amounts to around 70 percent (for both men and women) whereas it is  
about 20 percent for men and about 15 percent for women who have a degree. 
 
3.2 Sorting by ability? 
As Robst acknowledges, the sorting into matched and mismatched jobs could be a result 
of ability differences between the individuals. For example, if there is excess supply from 
certain fields of education it might be the low ability (and low productivity) individuals 
who have to settle for jobs that do not match their education. The dataset provides us with 
a cognitive test result for 90 percent of the men. At the age of eighteen all Swedish men 
take  this  test  when  enlisting  in  the  military.
16  When  we  estimate  the  effect  of  being 
mismatched/weakly matched for this subset of men we find (column 4 in table 3) that the 
income penalty is as large as in the main sample (column 3), i.e. 32 percent for the 
mismatched and 7 percent for the weakly matched men. In column 5, when the cognitive 
test score has been added to the income equation, the income penalty remains unchanged 
for both the mismatched and the weakly matched men.
17 Hence, we are able to conclude 
that the result is not driven by a sorting by ability. 
 
3.3 Is work experience a substitute for education-specific skills? 
If the mismatch effect varies with potential experience, this might tell us something about 
what  is  causing  the  income  penalty,  and  whether  work  experience  and  training  are  
substitutes for education-specific skills. 
      (Table 4 about here) 
                                                 
16 Even if enlisting in the military is mandatory in Sweden some people have been exempted from enlisting 
because of health reasons. For more information about the test, see Nordin (2008). 
17 When using subtests of the enlistment test, which measure different kinds of skills (e.g. verbal, spatial or 
logical skills), the results also hold.   8 
  By interacting the mismatch and the weak match variables with the experience 
variable we analyze whether the return to experience differs for the three groups.
18 The 
results are reported in table 4, column (1) for men and column (4) for women. For men,  
the  mismatched  individuals  have  a  substantially  higher  return  to  experience  than  the 
matched individuals. Weakly matched women have a lower return to experience than 
matched women, but for the mismatched women the return to experience is the same as 
for the correctly matched women. More detail is provided for men and women in figures 
1 and 2 respectively, where the income premia for each year of experience are illustrated 
separately for each group.
19 For men, figure 1 clearly shows that the negative influence of 
being mismatched decreases with potential experience. The income penalty is roughly 
twice  as  large  for  those  with  little  experience  compared  to  for  those  with  fifteen  to 
nineteen  years  of  experience.  The  same  clear  pattern  is  not  observed  in  figure  2  for 
women.
20 Hence, for mismatched men it seems as if investment in work experience partly 
closes the gap in education–specific skills.  
      (Figures 1 and 2 about  here) 
 
3.4 Same occupation, different fields of education 
Controlling for occupation instead of field of education changes the research question 
somewhat. When using fixed effects to control for occupation the specification gives us 
the income difference between two individuals who work in the same occupation (and 
who  have  the  same  years  of  education  and  degree/no  degree)  but  where  one  has  a 
                                                 
18 To facilitate the comparison the squared experience variables are excluded. This is done primarily since 
the linear experience coefficient for women is negative (which does not mean that the return to experience 
generally is negative – see our further analysis of the return to experience reported in Figure 2) which 
means that the comparing becomes difficult.  
19 Here we estimate a fully flexible model where each year of experience, for each group, is represented by 
a dummy variable. It should be noted that the method for constructing potential experience implies that the 
experience estimates at the ends of the experience distribution are based on distinct groups of individuals. 
For example, the least experienced are all aged 28 and have seventeen years of schooling and the most 
experienced are all aged 39 and have thirteen years of schooling. This means that the experience estimates 
will gradually be based on more variation in age and years of schooling when going from the ends of the 
experience distribution. But as the experience estimates, from 8 to 15 years of experience, are based on all 
possible number of years of schooling, the variation in age will at its most be five age-groups, implying that 
the experience estimates will to some extent reflect cohort differences.   
20 The U-shaped pattern probably reflects the period in their life-cycle when high-educated women in 
Sweden tend to have children, i.e. a couple of years after finishing their higher education. 
   9 
matching education (or a weakly matching education) and the other does not.  According 
to the results in table 4, column (2) for men and column (5) for women, for individuals 
working in the same occupation the income is around 13 percent lower (for both men and 
women) for the mismatched individuals.  
 
3.5 Are the mismatched individuals working less than full-time? 
Another factor contributing to the large mismatch effect might be that the mismatched 
individuals have a weak position in the labor market, and often work part-time or have 
temporary jobs. Excluding individuals with an annual income below SEK 50 000, i.e.  
people  not  working  full-time  and/or  full-year,  enables  us  to  analyze  whether  the 
mismatch penalty changes. For this restricted sample, column (3) in table 4 for men and 
column (6) for women report a considerably lower income penalty for the mismatched 
individuals, 17 percent for men and 12 percent for women, compared to the full sample. 
This finding reveals that the mismatch penalty, in part, may be associated with having a 
very low annual income, and probably reflects a weak labor market position. Restricting 
the  sample  to  those  with  an  annual  income  above  SEK  100  000  lowers  the  income 
penalty further, to 9 percent for men and 5 percent for women. Re-estimating the more 
flexible years of experience model (with interactions, corresponding to columns (1) and 
(4) in table 4) for the income-restricted samples tends to decrease the differences in return 
to experience between the matched and the mismatched groups.   
That the differences in returns to experience largely disappear when the lowest 
annual incomes are excluded shows that really low incomes are relatively frequent among 
the mismatched with low levels of experience. At the same time, though, the share of 
mismatched  individuals  is  almost  constant  over  the  experience  distribution  (table  2 
reports that the mean  years of experience  are almost the same for the  three  groups). 
Together  these  findings  indicate  that  the  mismatched  individuals,  initially  probably 
working part-time and/or in temporary jobs, with increasing experience tend to get full-
time, full-year employment. Still, as the share of mismatched individuals does not change 
with years of experience, they seem to stay mismatched. 
 
4. Conclusions   10 
The rather specialized university/college education in Sweden probably contributes to the  
substantial income penalty for working in an occupation that does not match one’s field 
of education. When comparing two men with the same educational background (same 
field  of  education,  same  years  of  schooling  and  having/not  having  a  degree)  the 
mismatched man suffers a 32 percent income penalty. The corresponding income penalty 
for women is 28 percent.   
By controlling for cognitive ability we establish that (at least for men) the income 
penalty is not caused by a sorting by ability. If the individual chooses field of education 
based on personal endowments (other than cognitive ability), the income penalty might 
still depend on a mismatch in personal skills rather than a mismatch in field of education-
occupation. But since the income penalty could be wiped out by changing occupation, we 
argue that it is a true mismatch effect.  
  Finally,  the  income  penalty  decreases  with  (potential)  work  experience, 
particularly for men. The income penalty might therefore, partly, depend on a lack of 
education-specific skills, and work experience serve as a substitute that closes the skill 
gap. A plausible explanation for the finding is that attaining necessary skills helps to turn 
part-time and temporary employment into full-time and permanent employment but there 
is no evidence that the mismatched individuals move to a matching occupation over time. 
Thus, for some, the income penalty seems to be permanent. This is also supported by our 
findings for the restricted income samples. Also for these groups of individuals, likely to 
be full-time, full-year workers, there is a significant and substantial (even if smaller than 
for  the  unrestricted  sample)  income  penalty  for  being  mismatched  for  both  higher-
educated men and higher-educated women. 
With data available on hourly wage, hours of work, actual work experience and 
training, these issues should be analyzed more rigorously in the future.  
From a theoretical perspective, the existence of human capital mismatch raises 
some important questions. According to human capital theory a worker is paid his/her 
marginal product, which is only determined by the human capital of the individual. Wage 
differences between matched and mismatched workers contradict human capital theory, 
since  they  indicate  that  the  marginal  product  of  a  worker  also  depends  on  his/her 
occupation/job  (see  Hartog  &  Oosterbeek,  1988).  Based  on  evidence  from  the   11 
overeducation literature, McGuinness (2006) relates the findings to assignment models 
(Sattinger,  1993),  in  which  the  assumption  is  that  wages  are  determined  both  by  the 
human capital of the worker and by the occupation/job characteristics. Thus, our findings 
provide additional support for the assignment model.  
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Table A1. Variable list 
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Table A2. The field of education – occupation matches respectively weak matches. 
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# !+￿￿￿￿￿￿￿!￿￿ 37￿ ￿￿ 1￿ ￿ 7￿ ￿ ￿￿ (￿ 14￿ ￿ 3￿ 115￿ ￿ 7￿￿ ￿7￿ 1￿
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the matched, the weakly matched and the mismatched individuals. 
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Table 3. OLS income equation estimates.
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￿ $% B￿ ’￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ’￿￿ ￿ 1￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿AAA￿ ’￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿AAA￿ ’￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿A￿
* ￿!￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ 3￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿AAA￿
) ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿" ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ +￿!￿ +￿!￿ +￿!￿ +￿!￿
C B￿ ￿ 41￿5￿ ￿ 415￿ ￿ ￿ 412(￿ ￿ 412(￿ ￿ 4￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ 5￿ 4375￿ 5￿ 4375￿ 5￿ 4375￿ (1427(￿ (1427(￿
+ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
. ￿!￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿73￿￿￿￿ ￿ (￿AAA￿ ’￿315￿￿￿￿ ￿ 5￿AAA￿ ’￿￿(2￿￿￿￿ ￿ 5￿AAA￿ ￿
/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1￿ ￿AAA￿ ’￿1￿ 1￿￿￿￿ 1￿ ￿AAA￿ ’￿￿ 5(￿￿￿￿ 1￿ ￿AAA￿ ￿
  ￿￿￿!￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿19￿￿￿￿ ￿ 3￿AAA￿ ￿1(9￿￿￿￿ ￿ 9￿AAA￿ ￿￿ 21￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿AAA￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ’￿357￿￿￿￿ 1￿ ￿AAA￿ ￿
￿ $% ￿ ’￿￿ 59￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿AAA￿ ’￿￿ 5￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿AAA￿ ’￿￿ 5￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿AAA￿ ￿
￿ $% B￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿AAA￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿AAA￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿AAA￿ ￿ ￿
) ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿" ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ +￿!￿ +￿!￿ ￿ ￿
C B￿ ￿ 4￿ 717￿ ￿ 4￿ 27￿ ￿ 41￿ (￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿ 1124￿7￿￿ 1124￿7￿￿ 1124￿7￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿
aThe dependent variable is logarithmic annual income from work. In all models we control for years of 
schooling, experience, experience squared, married, and labor market region. In column (2) field of 
education is added, and in column (3) we also add if the individual does not have a degree. In columns 
(4) and (5) the sample is restricted to those who have taken the enlistment test. In column (4) it is the 
same  model  as  in  column  (3).  In  column  (5)  the  test  score  is  included  in  the  model  specification. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 4. OLS income equation estimates.
a 
  &￿￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿ ./ 0￿ .1 0￿ .2 0￿ .3 0￿ .4 0￿ .5 0￿
. ￿!￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿￿37￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿AAA￿ ’￿1￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ (￿AAA￿ ’￿17(￿￿￿￿ ￿ 9￿AAA￿ ’￿3￿ 3￿￿￿￿ ￿9￿AAA￿ ’￿13￿￿￿￿￿ 1￿ ￿AAA￿ ’￿112￿￿￿￿ ￿ 9￿AAA￿
/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿1￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿AAA￿ ’￿￿ 19￿￿￿￿ ￿ 5￿AAA￿ ’￿￿ 3￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 9￿AAA￿ ￿￿ 11￿￿￿￿ 3￿ ￿￿ ’￿￿ ￿ 3￿￿￿￿ 1￿￿￿ ’￿￿ 7￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿AAA￿
  ￿￿￿!￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ 71￿￿￿￿ ￿ 9￿AAA￿ ￿￿ 32￿￿￿￿ ￿ 3￿AAA￿ ￿￿ 91￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿AAA￿ ￿￿ 57￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿AAA￿ ￿￿ ￿(￿￿￿￿ ￿ 9￿AAA￿ ￿￿ 92￿￿￿￿ ￿ 3￿AAA￿
￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’￿391￿￿￿￿ ￿ 5￿AAA￿ ’￿￿59￿￿￿￿ ￿ 5￿AAA￿ ’￿￿￿ 1￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿AAA￿ ’￿321￿￿￿￿ 1￿ ￿AAA￿ ’￿￿22￿￿￿￿ 1￿ ￿AAA￿ ’￿17￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿AAA￿
￿ $% ￿ ￿￿ ￿1￿￿￿￿ ￿ 1￿AAA￿ ￿￿ 35￿￿￿￿ ￿ 9￿AAA￿ ￿￿ 91￿￿￿￿ ￿ 3￿AAA￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 1￿AAA￿ ’￿￿ 5￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿AAA￿ ’￿￿ 39￿￿￿￿ ￿ 3￿AAA￿
￿ $% B￿   ’￿￿ ￿ 1￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿AAA￿ ’￿￿ ￿ 1￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿AAA￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿AAA￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿AAA￿
￿ $% A￿￿!￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ 12￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿AAA￿   ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 3￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿  
￿ $% A￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿AAA￿   ￿ ’￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿AAA￿  
) ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿" ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ +￿!￿ ￿￿￿ +￿!￿ +￿!￿ ￿￿￿ +￿!￿
, ￿￿￿ % ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ +￿!￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ +￿!￿ ￿￿￿
C B￿ ￿125￿ ￿￿￿9￿ ￿￿(7￿ ￿1￿ 9￿ ￿13(￿ ￿1(5￿
￿￿ 5￿ 4375￿ 5￿ 4375￿ ((4￿59￿ 1124￿7￿￿ 1124￿7￿￿ 1￿ 74(32￿
aThe  dependent  variable  is  logarithmic  annual  income  from  work.  In  all  models  we  control  for  years  of 
schooling, no degree, married, and labor market region. In columns (1) and (3) for men and columns (4) and (6) 
for women field of education is controlled for. In column (1) for men and column (4) for women interactions 
between  experience  and  the  mismatch  and  weak  match  variables  are  included.  In  columns  (2)  and  (5) 
occupation is controlled for. In columns (3) and (6) the sample is restricted to those with an annual income 
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Figure 1. Male income premia for years of    Figure 2. Female income premia for years  
 experience    of experience 
   
    
 